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Integrating Social and Moral Psychology to Reduce Inequality 
 Lewis (2021) poses an important question: Is it possible to achieve equality, and if so, 
how? This question is at the root of social psychology, which originated in scholars' desire to 
understand and prevent atrocities such as the Holocaust (e.g., Allport, 1954; Milgram, 1974). 
Since that time, the field has become increasingly concerned with questions about basic 
cognitive processes, with some scholars (e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Cialdini, 
2009; Swencionis & Goff, 2017) noting that the field could benefit from greater engagement 
with the world beyond the lab. It is thus especially gladdening to see scholarship bringing 
together these different parts of the field by using advances in basic science to speak to some of 
humanity's most pernicious problems, as Lewis (2021) does.  
 It is also heartening to see the target article make explicit connections to moral 
psychology—for instance, by pointing out that to some people, pursuing equality could mean 
"giving good things to bad people." Moral psychology and social psychological work on 
intergroup relations are conceptually linked: if we perceive inequality to be immoral, then 
knowledge about increasing moral behavior should inform efforts toward equality, and 
knowledge about increasing equality should inform interventions designed to increase moral 
behavior. However, currently, the two literatures are quite distinct. We are therefore gratified 
that the target article draws on concepts from both areas. Here, we elaborate on what moral 
psychology can teach about inequality and highlight additional ways that work on moral 
psychology and intergroup bias can join together to inform equality-promoting interventions. 
The Importance of Morality 
 The view that judgments regarding "bad people" stymie efforts toward equality is 
consistent with work on the power of moral evaluations. Morality plays a strong role in overall 
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impressions of another person (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; 
Heiphetz, 2020). Indeed, many view morality as a defining feature of identity, reporting that 
people would become entirely different if their moral characteristics changed (Strohminger & 
Nichols, 2014). Thus, judgments of others' moral character can be especially powerful. 
 Some work in moral psychology suggests that people readily attribute good moral 
character to others (De Freitas, Cikara, Grossmann, & Schlegel, 2017). For instance, they report 
that actions they perceive as morally good reflect a person's "true self," whereas actions they 
perceive as morally bad do not (Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014). Further, adults judge that 
people would change more when their characteristics worsen rather than improve (Heiphetz, 
Strohminger, Gelman, & Young, 2018; Molouki & Bartels, 2017; Tobia, 2016), suggesting that 
participants may perceive improvements as relatively consistent with who a person was 
originally (in contrast to changes from good to bad characteristics, which may be perceived as 
causing people to move away from their "true selves").  
 Reading this literature can certainly provide a more optimistic impression of human 
nature than one obtains from the social psychological literature on intergroup relations, which 
indicates that people often view out-group members in morally negative terms (e.g., as bad, 
criminal, violent, etc.; Jarvis & Okonofua, 2019; Rattan, Levine, Dweck, & Eberhardt, 2012; 
Richardson & Goff, 2012). This negativity extends even to the spaces associated with members 
of marginalized groups (Massey & Denton, 1993; Powell, 2009). In one study, for instance, 
participants (who were predominantly White in this research) perceived Black areas as 
impoverished, crime-ridden, rundown, dangerous, and dirty (Bonam, Bergsieker, & Eberhardt, 
2016). 
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 In fact, people from some groups may not be viewed as people at all. Participants view 
Black men as ape-like (Kahn, Goff, & McMahon, 2015), attribute emotions that they perceive to 
be uniquely human to in-group members more than to out-group members (Leyens, Demoulin, 
Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007), and view women as a collection of body parts (Bernard, 
Gervais, Allen, Campomizzi, & Klein, 2012) or imbue them with an inordinate significance, an 
act that can remove women from moral consideration and leave them vulnerable to harm and 
exploitation (Kiefer, Mosley, & Landau, 2017). Participants also explicitly rate members of some 
groups—including Arabs, Muslims, and people involved in the legal system—as less human than 
dominant groups such as "Americans" and "Whites" (Heiphetz & Craig, in press; Kteily, 
Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). This dehumanization may help explain the discrepancy 
between work on the "good true self" and work on intergroup bias. After all, the view that human 
beings are morally good need not extend to those perceivers view as less than fully human. 
Viewing outgroup members outside the scope of justice excludes them from a moral 
psychological boundary where concerns about fairness and equality govern their actions (Staub, 
1990). If escalated, this moral exclusion can even justify human rights violations and reduce 
necessary interventions (Kelman, 1976; Opotow, 1990). Thus, dehumanization may underlie the 
view that some group members are not moral and do not deserve equal rights.   
The failure to attribute moral goodness to members of marginalized groups provides an 
extreme example of the deficit-based frameworks Lewis (2021) references. As the target paper 
notes, people from the United States (and especially dominant group members according to some 
analyses, Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Hunt, 2007; Leahy, 1983) readily "assume 
there is something inherently wrong with" members of marginalized groups. In addition to the 
examples noted in the target paper (e.g., related to education), deficit-based explanations may 
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also apply to inferences about moral character. As in other domains (Cheryan & Markus, 2020; 
Devos & Banaji, 2005), dominant group members may view their in-group as prototypical and 
judge out-group members against that perceived default. In the context of morality, dominant 
group members may view their own group's behaviors and standards as morally good and find 
members of marginalized groups wanting when compared with this standard. Indeed, dominant 
group members sometimes view cultural objects (e.g., music, art, clothing) as deficient when 
associated with minoritized group members while viewing those same objects as valuable when 
in-group members take them for their own use (Mosley & Biernat, in press; Mosley, Biernat, & 
Adams, in preparation). 
 Such deficit-based inferences are themselves negative and also have damaging 
downstream consequences. Viewing other people as inherently bad deep down inside leads to 
negative attitudes (Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2021), reduced generosity (Heiphetz, 2019), and 
increased punitiveness (Giles, 2003), among other outcomes. Changing the perception that some 
people are "bad" and unworthy of the good things in life may therefore reduce the harm people 
are willing to bring upon each other, including harms associated with maintaining inequality. 
How, then, do we change perceptions of "badness" and prevent their negative consequences from 
occurring?  
Integrating Social and Moral Psychology to Inform Interventions 
 Because psychology is the study of the mind—literally, the psyche—its toolbox is 
particularly well designed for individual-level interventions. For example, work from social 
psychology has highlighted the importance of individuating information in reducing 
dehumanization, showing less dehumanization of marginalized groups when participants made 
individuating judgments (e.g., whether the target likes broccoli) and more dehumanization when 
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participants made categorical judgments (e.g., whether or not the target was middle aged; Harris 
& Fiske, 2007). Such interventions increase the perception that other human beings are in fact 
human and therefore capable of being moral (Kagan, 2004; Haslam, 2006). If perceptions 
regarding "bad" people underlie portions of the inequality currently present in society, then 
reducing dehumanization may increase equality.  
 Another example from individual-level interventions that can increase the perception that 
members of marginalized groups can be good people comes from the moral psychology literature 
on "moral circles," or the group of people that one views as worthy of moral consideration 
(Graham, Waytz, Meindl, Iyer, & Young, 2017). Individuals commonly place marginalized out-
group members outside the moral circle, perceiving themselves not to have moral obligations 
toward these individuals (Kelman, 1976; Opotow, 1990). To the extent that people perceive 
equality as a moral obligation, placing someone beyond one's moral circle would allow people to 
engage in unequal treatment on the basis of group membership while still seeing themselves as 
morally good. Consequently, expanding dominant group members' moral circles could reduce 
their comfort with inequality. Several factors predict the size of individuals' moral circles, 
including individual differences (e.g., people who view morality as an important part of their 
self-concept have larger moral circles than people who do not; Reed & Aquino, 2003) and 
contextual variables (e.g., people's moral circles expand when they decide whom to exclude and 
shrink when they decide whom to include; Laham, 2009). People are also more likely to expand 
their moral circles and focus their attention to distant others when they feel that their own basic 
needs have been met and when they view resources as abundant, thus allowing for the 
prioritization of universal values of equality (Crimston, Bain, Hornsey & Bastian, 2016). 
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Intervening on these factors could shift the size of people's moral circles and potentially 
encourage them to extend moral concern to a larger and more diverse group of people.  
 As Lewis (2021) points out, individual-level solutions such as these must work in concert 
with structural-level solutions (see also Salter, Adams, & Perez, 2018, on the importance of 
"reconstruct[ing] worlds that promote antiracist tendencies," p. 153). Work on the normative 
power of law supports Lewis's (2021) argument that structural interventions can provide 
supportive environments for individual-level changes. This work describes the legal system as 
communicating information about both prescriptive norms (what people should do) and 
descriptive norms (what people actually do). Because most people usually follow the law (Tyler, 
2006), knowing that a particular behavior is illegal can lead people to conclude that it is 
uncommon. Additionally, people often conflate descriptive and prescriptive norms, judging that 
common behaviors are moral whereas uncommon behaviors are not (Bear & Knobe, 2017; 
Goldring & Heiphetz, 2020; Roberts, Gelman, & Ho, 2017). Because laws can communicate 
information about both commonality and morality, laws curtailing inequality can both reduce the 
prevalence of and shape moral inferences about discrimination. 
 Recent empirical work supports this possibility. For instance, support for interracial 
marriage in the United States increased following the Loving v. Virginia court case that legalized 
these marriages (Newport, 2013). Similarly, explicit and implicit anti-gay bias decreased 
following legalization of same-sex marriage (Ofosu, Chambers, Chen, & Hehman, 2019). In 
cases like these, structural interventions at the government level (e.g., changing laws) appear to 
have shaped individual attitudes, perhaps by communicating that inequality that was once 
acceptable no longer is.  
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 In addition to reducing prejudiced attitudes at the individual level, equality-promoting 
laws can also encourage people to perform egalitarian behaviors. Work on morality has long 
emphasized the distinction between obligatory acts, which people judge to be requirements of a 
moral life, and supererogatory acts, which people judge as good but not necessary (Cornwell & 
Higgins, 2015; Eisenberg-Berg, 1979; Kahn, 1992; Lovett, Jordan, & Wiltermuth, 2012). People 
commonly judge that it is obligatory to avoid harmful behaviors, such as causing another person 
bodily injury, and supererogatory to perform pro-social behaviors, such as helping another 
person (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Kahn, 1992; Killen & Turiel, 1998). Individual 
actions that promote equality (e.g., hiring someone from a marginalized group; moving to a 
particular neighborhood; sending one's child to the local public school) can often seem pro-social 
and therefore supererogatory. However, people often perceive an obligation to follow the law 
(Tyler, 2006). Therefore, legislation can shift equality from supererogatory to obligatory. In so 
doing, legislation can increase steps that people take in their own lives to treat people equally 
regardless of group membership.  
 Data regarding the association between societal laws as well as interpersonal attitudes 
and behaviors highlight another interplay between structural and individual interventions. 
Although structural interventions can provide support for individual-level change, they also 
make such change less necessary. Following Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 Supreme Court case 
that mandated marriage equality throughout the United States, same-sex couples' marriage rights 
no longer depended on the goodwill of neighbors who previously could have voted to deny this 
right and refused to sign marriage licenses with no legal repercussions. Of course, interpersonal 
bias is still responsible for numerous harms. Exposure to such bias harms marginalized group 
members in nearly every domain, including physical health (Onyeador et al., 2020; van Ryn et 
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al., 2011), emotional well-being (Brown et al., 2000), education (Lewis & Sekaquaptewa, 2016), 
and interpersonal relationships (Trail, Goff, Bradbury, & Karney, 2012). However, when laws 
sanction the extreme behavioral consequences of personal bias, the biases themselves become 
somewhat less consequential. In the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., "It may be true that the 
law cannot change the heart but it can restrain the heartless. It may be true that the law cannot 
make a man love me but it can keep him from lynching me and I think that is pretty important, 
also" (King, 1963). 
Conclusions 
 Social psychology was founded on scholars' desire to grapple with the messy and 
complicated world outside the lab using scientific tools. Subsequently, some scholars 
(Baumeister et al., 2007; Cialdini, 2009; Swencionis & Goff, 2017) have called for a return to 
deep engagement with the world beyond the lab. Answering this call, the target article describes 
how rigorous science can address the problem of inequality. In so doing, the article demonstrates 
that social psychology integrates well with other fields, including the study of morality, to 
provide a fuller understanding of why inequality exists and how people can reduce it. This article 
provides a strong path forward for integrating across areas of study to bring science to bear on 
society's most pressing problems. 
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